STATUTE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. NO ROOM FOR ARGUMENT AND NO ROOM FOR CONSTRUCTION.

Const. Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 5

STATUTE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF

Any Attempt To Make It Clearer Is A Vain Labor And Tends Only To Obscurity

There is no uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, or vagueness in the words used. The language is plain and the meaning is clear.

There is nothing doubtful in the words themselves, nothing ambiguous, nothing to be explained, and, therefore, NO ROOM FOR ARGUMENT AND NO ROOM FOR CONSTRUCTION.

Natural Born Citizens (Const. Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 5) are not made by law or otherwise, but born (of citizen parents).

NATURAL BORN CITIZEN

4. Natural Born Citizen

1. The language of the Constitution is unambiguous. The definition of "natural-born" is Res Ipsa Loquitur, "the thing speaks for itself," not by any statutory definition.

2. Natural-born citizenship is derived through birth to citizen parents. It is founded on, or derived from, the law of nature, not from positive (statutory man-made) law.

3. Congress cannot statutorily create natural-born citizens. 'Natural' is based on natural law, not statute. The same can be said about marriage between man and wife. No law or statute is required to define a natural state.

4. A child born of an American mother and an alien father cannot be a natural born citizen.

5. The term "natural-born" was commonly understood and there was no reason to define the term. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, following the American Revolution, the term was well known to mean those born of citizens, most of whom had yet to be born.

The Constitution is certain and fixed. It contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon by the temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with the tide of events. In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.

A provision of the Constitution does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time.

The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its framers and the people who adopted it. The necessities which gave birth to the Constitution, the controversies which preceded its formation, and the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, may properly be taken into view for the purpose of tracing to its source any particular provision of the Constitution in order thereby to be enabled to correctly interpret its meaning.

On every question of construction we should carry ourselves back to the time, when the constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and instead of trying to find, what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one, in which it passed.

The history of the times, the state of things existing when the provision was framed and adopted, should be looked to in order to ascertain the mischief and the remedy. As nearly as possible, we should place ourselves in the condition of those who framed and adopted it. And if the meaning be at all doubtful, the doubt should be resolved, wherever reasonably possible to do so, in a way to forward the evident purpose with which the provision was adopted.

The language of the Constitution is to be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who employed them. Not what words did Madison and Hamilton use, but what was it in their minds which they conveyed?

To ascertain the meaning of a constitutional provision or rule of procedure we first look to the normal, plain meaning of the language. The intent of the framers is first sought from the terminology used in the provision, with each word being given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning.

Since Constitutions are the basic and organic law, and are meant to be known and understood by all the people, the words used should be given the meaning which would be given to them in common and ordinary usage by the average man in interpreting them in relation to every day affairs.

Common sense is the foundation of all authorities, of the laws themselves, and of their construction. Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding and should, therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties which may make anything mean everything or nothing at pleasure. The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear, there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.

If the language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the provision's terms to inform our analysis. If the words are not ambiguous, the inquiry is terminated, for the Court is not at liberty to search beyond the Constitution itself where the intention of the framers is clearly demonstrated by the phraseology utilized.

It is axiomatic that where the language of a Constitution is clear and unambiguous, there can be no resort to construction to attribute to the founders a purpose or intent not manifest in its letter. The constitution is an instrument from the people and a construction thereof should effectuate their purpose from the words employed in the document; and the courts may not color it by the addition of words or the ingrafting of their views as to how it should be written.

The constitutional words deserve deference and precise definition. When a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men who, for the time being, have power to declare what the Constitution is according to their own views of what it ought to mean.

The purpose and object sought to be attained by the framers of the constitution is to be looked for, and the will and intent of the people who ratified it is to be made effective. As nearly as possible, we should place ourselves in the condition of those who framed and adopted it. On every question of construction we should carry ourselves back to the time, when the constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and instead of trying to find, what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one, in which it passed.

We are bound to interpret the constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted. We must place ourselves in the position of the men who framed and adopted the Constitution, and inquire what they must have understood to be the meaning and scope of its provisions. The necessities which gave birth to the Constitution, the controversies which preceded its formation, and the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, may properly be taken into view for the purpose of tracing to its source any particular provision of the Constitution, in order thereby to be enabled to correctly interpret its meaning.

The line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers. In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such interpretation as will secure the result which was intended to be accomplished by those who framed it and the people who adopted it.

Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness. The language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evident meaning.

Where language is clear and unambiguous, any inquiry into intent is unnecessary, and statute must be applied as written.

If the meaning of the text is clear, the inquiry ends.

As has been repeatedly declared by the courts the best rule for interpreting the technical terms employed in the Constitution is to give to them the meaning which they had at the time that instrument was framed and adopted.

The framers of the Constitution were not mere visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but practical men dealing with the facts of political life as they understood them: putting into form the government they were creating and prescribing, in language clear and intelligible, the powers that government was to take.

As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.

There is nothing ambiguous in the term "natural-born". There is nothing doubtful in the words themselves, nothing ambiguous, nothing to be explained, and, therefore, no room for construction.

The definition of "natural-born" is Res Ipsa Loquitur, "facts speak for themselves". Congress cannot statutorily create natural-born citizens. 'Natural' is based on natural law, not statute. There is no court ruling on natural born because it is under natural law. The same can be said about marriage between man and wife. It is under natural law. That's why there's resistance to writing a law defining marriage as between a man and a woman. No law or statute is required to define a natural state.

Natural Born Citizenship is founded on the law of nature, not positive (statutory man-made) law. Natural-born citizenship is derived through birth to citizen parents.

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NATURAL BORN CITIZEN

3. Natural Born Citizen

Religion has been closely identified with our history and government. SCHOOL DIST. OF ABINGTON TP. V. SCHEMPP, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); VAN ORDEN V. PERRY, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. ENGEL V. VITALE, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); SCHOOL DIST. OF ABINGTON TP. V. SCHEMPP, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).

Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PA. v. CASEY, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

Covenant is a religious concept, originating in the ancient Near Eastern religions. Covenant is also a critical component of Christianity. Indeed, the very salvation offered through Jesus Christ is called the New Covenant. See, e.g., Luke 22:20. From Christianity, the idea of covenant was adopted by the American Founding Fathers: 'Viewing the United States Constitution as the critical expression of the American constitutional tradition, we move back in time, seeking the less differentiated, more embryonic expression of what is in that document. Our search takes us to the earliest state constitution, then to colonial documents of foundation that are essentially constitutional such as the Pilgrim Code of Law, and then to proto-constitutions such as the Mayflower Compact. The political covenants written by English colonists in America lead us to the church covenants written by radical Protestants in the late 1500s and early 1600s, and these in turn lead us back to the Covenant tradition of the Old Testament. The American constitutional tradition derives much of its form and content from the Judeo-Christian tradition as interpreted by the radical Protestant sects to which belonged so many of the original European settlers of British North America.' Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism 6-7 (1982). One covenant principle that we see plainly in scripture is that a covenant may not be added to without mutual consent. We see God Himself revealing this principle in His covenant with Israel: "Do not add to what I command you." Deuteronomy 4:2. Any judge or justice who makes up out of whole cloth a new fundamental right, or arrogates to himself authority or power not granted by the Constitution, certainly adds to our national covenant, and thus becomes a covenant breaker.

In his landmark book, The Origins of American Constitutionalism, political scientist Donald Lutz reminds us that the genesis of a society's political values predates its written political documents. Indeed, a society's deepest values are born in its people's most ancient, primal, and unspoken worldview: 'Essentially a people share symbols and myths that provide meaning to their existence together and link them to some transcendent order. They can thus act together and answer the basic political questions: through what procedures do we reach collective decisions? By what standards do we judge our actions? What qualities or characteristics do we strive to maintain among ourselves? What kind of people do we wish to become? What qualities or characteristics do we seek or require in those who lead us? Far from being the repository of irrationality, these shared symbols and myths are the basis upon which collective, rational action is possible. Since these myths and symbols are frequently expressed in political documents, they tend to structure the form, determine the content, and define the meaning of the words in these documents. . . . By studying the political documents of a people, we can watch the gradual unfolding, elaboration and alteration of the myths and symbols that define them.' Through detailed empirical research, Lutz traces the roots of the core American constitutional tradition back in time to earlier state constitutions, colonial charters, English church covenants, and, ultimately, the Old Testament. Viewed in this fashion, the U.S. Constitution is only the latest written expression of Western values that have been developed and modified over thousands of years.

The further back one goes in American history, the more saturated with Hebraic references and allusions one finds American culture to be. Ironically, it is this Hebraic milieu rather than one grounded in the Christian New Testament, which most fueled the fires of motivation and imagination among American Christian colonists and founders of the Republic. Thus, Cecil Roth could write that were we to 'deprive modern Europe and America of their Hebraic heritage . . . the result would be barely recognizable.'

As scholars of religion and American history have repeatedly shown, American national identity has been shaped by the biblical language chosen by the first settlers, leaders, and preachers to emphasize both covenant and apocalypse. Of particular appeal to early Americans - from the Puritans to the architects of the American constitution - was the text of Deuteronomy, outlining the covenant between God and Israel. Like the Israelites, early Americans understood themselves to be entering into the Promised Land. Following the covenantal pattern outlined in Deuteronomy of prescribed moral and legal obligations to be kept by the people of Israel in return for God's blessing, the settlers understood themselves to be obligated to do God's will in return for God's blessings.

The Puritans and their covenantal documents have had a lasting influence on American political life. As Sacvan Bercovitch, a scholar of American literature, puts it, 'Their influence appears most clearly in the extraordinary persistence of a rhetoric grounded in the Bible, and in the way that Americans keep returning to that rhetoric, especially in times of crisis, as a source of cohesion and continuity.' Some scholars have gone as far as to argue that the covenantal model was foundational for American political theory and practice.

Since Biblical times, it has been common practice to preclude foreigners from serving as political leaders. The Torah dictates, 'Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom YHVH thy God shall choose one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee: thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother.'

As Joseph Story observed in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States permitting a citizen, other than a natural born citizen, to be President of the United States was an exception to "the great fundamental policy of all governments, to exclude foreign influence from their executive councils and duties." III J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States Section 1473 (Boston: Little, Brown: 1833). This "fundamental policy," in turn, was derived from the law of Moses which prohibited anyone, but a natural born citizen of Israel, from being king. Deuteronomy 17:14-15.

The basis of a natural-born requirement traces back to the Torah, where Moses prophesied about the people of Israel getting a king. The whole notion of a natural-born citizen is designed for the purpose of making sure that the chief executive would not have politically divided loyalties.

The biblical text consistently affirms that God reserves for himself the right of choosing kings and prophets and of raising up judges (Dt 17:14-20; 18:18; Jdg 3:15). Deuteronomy 17:15 gives "firm yet emphatic permission" to Israel to have a king. YHVH's act of choosing a king serves as legitimizing him. The text stipulates that the king must be an Israelite and not a foreigner.

Natural Born status was a requirement to minimize international intrigue and prevent the highest office in the land being held by someone with foreign allegiances.

The Framers were all citizens, and most had prior loyalty to the King of England, once being British subjects. Because the U.S. was a newly formed nation, they exempted themselves from the natural-born citizen requirement by adding a grandfather clause. Martin Van Buren, born on December 5, 1782, was the first American President not born a British subject. Before he served in 1837, his seven presidential predecessors were eligible to serve because they were citizens at the time the Constitution was adopted. John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States, wrote a letter to George Washington on July 25, 1787, indicating that he feared the possibility that the commander-in-chief could devolve upon someone who was the subject of a foreign power at the time of the birth: "Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Commander in Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen." Historians agree that fear that a foreign ruler might someday be imported to reign over the United States prompted Jay's letter.

According to James Kent the relationship of a person to a nation was, like the relationship between husband and wife, parent and child, "derived from the law of nature," not from positive law. II J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 5 (Claytor's Pub. Unabridged Ed. 1827). Thus, a person born to parents whose covenant allegiance to a nation had previously been established was a "natural born citizen," born into the civil covenant, just like a child born into the marriage covenant of his father and mother. Such a person need not swear allegiance to become a citizen, for his allegiance is determined by birth. In contrast, a person born to parents in covenant allegiance to another nation could become a "naturalized” citizen, but only by swearing allegiance to another nation.

In order to be considered a Natural Born Citizen, both parents had to be U.S. Citizens at the time of birth. Thus, the 'grandfather clause'. The intent of our founding fathers was and is clear, that no Commander In Chief would have the potential for dual allegiances. Being 'born' with dual citizenship, and possible allegiances to Mexico, Kenya, or any other nation would thus not disqualify one from becoming a Senator, Congressman, or even Governor, but when it comes to POTUS and CIC the Constitution was very specific. If there was no difference then the Constitution would not contain the term "Natural Born Citizen" in Article II, and merely "Citizen" in Article I.

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NATURAL BORN CITIZEN

2. Natural Born Citizen

What is a "natural born" citizen? An obvious interpretation of a "natural born" person would be a child born in the United States to American parents. Likewise, a "naturalized” citizen, that is a person born in a foreign country to foreign parents who later acquired American citizenship through naturalization, would not be eligible to serve as President because that person would not be a “natural born” citizen. What about a child born in a foreign country to American parents?

As Judge Story suggests, the proper way in which to interpret the eligibility clause under the circumstances would be to look at its original purpose, and to adopt that interpretation which "best harmonizes with the nature and objects, the scope and design, of the instrument.” Although the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention and the authors of The Federalist did not discuss at length the eligibility clause, we know from reason and experience, as Story explained, that "the great fundamental policy of all governments" is "to exclude foreign influence from their executive councils." This, he observed, "cuts off all chances for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing for the office; and interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences of foreign governments in executive elections, which have inflicted the most serious evils upon the elective monarchies of Europe." It was thought dangerous, in other words, to make the presidency available to a person who might have just recently come to the United States and might still feel an allegiance to a king, a czar, or a foreign government.

The term "natural born citizen" in the Constitution draws on a long history in British common law. For example, a law passed in Britain in 1677 law says that "natural born" citizens include people born overseas to British citizens. This usage was undoubtedly known to John Jay, who apparently suggested the "natural born citizen" wording and who was the father of children born overseas while he was serving as a diplomat. This wording also appears in the Naturalization Act of 1790, which was passed by the first Congress, a Congress dominated by the Founding Fathers.

The Nationality Act of 1790, passed by the first Congress, stated that "children of citizens of the United States that may be born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States shall be considered as natural born citizens." That language did not remain in subsequent laws governing citizenship.

One authority on the presidency is confident that the principle survives. In the 1957 edition of his book, "The Presidency," Edward S. Corwin of Princeton University wrote that "the general sense of the provision of the 1790 act has been continued in force to this day."

The Annotated Constitution, prepared by the Library of Congress, cites only one authority on this question in its most recent issue, published in 1963. It refers to a 1950 analysis written for the Cornell Law Quarterly by Warren Freeman of the Rutgers University Law School faculty.

Freeman argued that "a foreign-born child of American parents can rightly aspire to the position of president and hold such high office in accord with the eligibility requirements laid down both under common law principles and the entire body of statutory law." He quoted heavily from an article written for the Albany Law Journal in 1904 by Alexander Porter Morse, whom he described as one of the foremost legal scholars on citizenship laws. Morse had written that the authors of the Constitution "generally used precise language" and would have used the term, "native born citizens" if they had meant to exclude from the presidency citizens born abroad of American parents.

The Framers were not men who dropped words in by accident. They thought about every word. They argued about every word. No word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.

The children of American citizens born abroad were always natural born citizens. It is grossly incorrect to conclude that "natural-born citizen" applies to everybody born in the United States, irrespective of circumstances. It is grossly incorrect to conclude that everybody born in the United States, irrespective of circumstances, is eligible to the Presidency, while the children of American citizens, born abroad, are not.

If the meaning of the text is clear, the inquiry ends. A natural born citizen is a person born of American parents. Thus a person born abroad of American parents, according to the Constitution, would be eligible to the office of President. This wording of the Constitution is believed to have been adopted as a tribute to Alexander Hamilton, who was born in the British West Indies.

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NATURAL BORN CITIZEN

1. Natural Born Citizen

1. Those born of parents who are citizens.

2. A person born of American parents. Thus a person born abroad of American parents, according to the Constitution, would be eligible to the office of President.

3. One whose citizenship is established by the jurisdiction which the United States already has over the parents of the child, not what is thereafter acquired by choice of residence in this country.

4. Those persons born whose father the United States already has an established jurisdiction over, i.e., born to father's who are themselves citizens of the United States.

5. One who is a citizen by no act of law.

If a person owes their citizenship to some act of law, they cannot be considered a natural-born citizen. This leads us to defining natural-born citizen under the laws of nature.

Children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children.

In order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for, if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country. Vattel, The Law of Nations: I. XIX. § 212.

The Framers were not men who dropped words in by accident. They thought about every word. They argued about every word.

By drawing on the term so well known from English law, the Founders were recognizing the law of hereditary, rather than territorial allegiance. Alexander Porter Morse, "Natural-Born-Citizen of the United States: Eligibility for the Office of President," Albany Law Journal, vol.66 (1904), pp. 99. The framers thought it wise, in view of the probable influx of European immigration, to provide that the President should at least be the child of citizens owing allegiance to the United States at the time of his birth. Morse, op. cit, p. 99.

The presidential eligibility clause was scarcely intended to bar the children of American parentage, whether born at sea or in foreign territory. The Founders and the first Congress, which passed the 1790 Naturalization Act, defined a "natural born" citizen as one whose citizenship is established by the jurisdiction which the United States already has over the parents of the child, not what is thereafter acquired by choice of residence in this country. Morse, op. cit., p. 99. Whoever drew the Act followed closely the various parliamentary statues of Great Britain; and its language in this relation indicates that the first congress entertained and declared that children of American parentage, wherever born, were within the constitutional designation, "natural-born citizens." The act is declaratory: but the reason that such children are natural born remains; that is, their American citizenship is natural -- the result of parentage -- and is not artificial or acquired by compliance with legislative requirements. Morse, op. cit., p. 100.

If the Founders had not wanted an expansive definition of citizenship, it would only have been necessary to say, 'no person, except a native-born citizen.' Morse, op. cit., p. 99.

It should be noted that Morse is reluctant to accept one implication of the dictionary definition of "native-born," namely, that it includes people born in the United States even if their parents are not citizens.

If you are born of American parents, you are a Natural Born Citizen.

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Statutory Construction

Const. Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 5: "Statute Speaks For Itself"

The basic interpretive task is to determine the intent of the Constitution, laws, and treaties, and to construe all instruments according to the sense of the terms and the intentions of the parties. In the interpretation of the Constitution, the first rule is to examine both the general structure and the component parts of the document, keeping in mind its overall objectives and scope of power. The function of the judge is to interpret the law, not to ignore its provisions and make the law. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution establishes a hierarchy of laws, with the Constitution itself standing at the apex of the system. The Constitution embodies the constituent or "permanent will" of the American people, which gives it a republican basis.

A basic interpretive task is the task of determining intent. What was the intent of the lawmakers who made the law? Of the foreign ministers who drafted the treaty? Of the delegates who wrote the Constitution? In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone noted that the first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is to construe them according to the sense of the terms and the intention of the parties. He went on to explain that words are generally to be understood according to their usual or popular usage. If they are ambiguous, then the next step is to try to establish their meaning from the context, or by comparing them with other words and sentences in the same instrument, or by comparing them with another law on the same subject. Failing here, the judge may find the intent of the law by observing the subject matter or the purpose of the law.

As for the effects and consequences, the rule, said Blackstone, is that where words seem to lead the court to absurd results, it is helpful to abandon their literal meaning and rely on common sense. Finally, wrote Blackstone, judges should consider the reason and spirit of the law when the words are dubious and the alternative means of construction have failed to uncover the intent of the lawmakers.

The intention of the lawmakers is the law. This intention is to be gathered from the necessity or reason of the enactment and the meaning of the words, enlarged or restricted according to their real intent. Where the intention of the legislature is plain, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Where there is no uncertainty, or ambiguity in the language of the law, the intention of the lawmakers is to be arrived at by the language used.

Where the meaning is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and nothing for construction to do.

When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction and the court is powerless to give it a different meaning.

In construction of statutes, intent of legislature must govern. Construction of statutory language is controlled by intent of legislature which must be determined from examination of language and purpose of statute.

The court does not make the law, but decides it. Legislative intent can only be arrived at by giving to the language its ordinary import.

The words of a statute cannot be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing cases merely because no good reason appears why those cases should be excluded. It is not the duty of the court to make the law reasonable, but to expound it as it stands, according to the real sense of the words.

If the language be plain, unambiguous, and uncontrolled by other parts of the act, or other acts or laws upon the same subject, the courts cannot give it a different meaning to subserve a public policy, or to maintain its constitutional validity.

The object of construction, applied to a constitution, is to give effect to the intent of its framers, and of the people in adopting it. This intent is to be found in the instrument itself; and, when the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument. LAKE COUNTY v. ROLLINS, 130 U.S. 662 (1889)

Statutory and constitutional construction rules require giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the language used. GARCIA V. UNITED STATES, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984). If the plain language is unambiguous, judicial inquiry ends, except in 'rare and exceptional circumstances.' Indeed, the Supreme Court has constantly reiterated that the language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evident meaning. SOLORIO v. UNITED STATES, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (quoting REID V. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1, 8 (1957)). It is the role of the Court to interpret the Constitution, not to add to it or subtract from it based on personal inclination.

A court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and legislative intent is best determined by the language of the statute. A court reading a statute should give the statutory language its plain and popularly understood meaning. When a statute is unambiguous, courts must enforce it as enacted. A court must not rewrite a statute to make it consistent with the court's idea of orderliness and public policy.

Where language of statute is unambiguous, court is powerless to intervene even to remedy mistake. Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, court is powerless to intervene and grant relief. Where the text is plain and unambiguous, courts are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself.

There is no room for judicial interpretation or construction of a statute containing plain and unambiguous language. When the plain language of a statute is clear, the court assumes the Legislature meant exactly what it said. Absent ambiguity, a statute's meaning is derived from its language alone.

An ambiguity exists if the language at issue is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. There is ambiguity if literal interpretation would lead to unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences. In case of incompleteness or ambiguity of expression the reason and spirit of the statute should be considered. Circumstances at time of enactment may be considered.

Unclear language in a statute can become clear if the congressional intent behind the legislation is reviewed.

With the text of a statute indeterminate, and in the absence of case law, an appellate court turns to the primary source of the statute, its legislative history, for guidance.

In searching for the clear expression of congressional intent in a statute, an appellate court is not limited to the text of the statute, but can consider all available evidence about the meaning of the statute, including its text, structure, and legislative history.

While statutes covering the same subject matter should be construed to harmonize them if possible, this does not empower courts to undercut the clearly expressed intent of Congress in enacting a particular statute. In cases of direct conflict, a specific statute overrides a general one, regardless of their dates of enactment.

A change in a rule cannot supplant a statute, including a statutorily based judicial decision. A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that, absent a clear direction of Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its enactment. It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction to construe a statute in accordance with its plain meaning.

Statutory construction begins with a look at the plain language of a rule; the plain language will control, unless use of the plain language would lead to an absurd result.

The ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity but no further.

It is only where the words are absolutely incapable of a construction that will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result that the words of the enactment must prevail.

When the language of a statute is plain it is not open to the court to remedy a defect of drafting.

If the words of an act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. If the words of an act admit two interpretations, and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the court will conclude the legislature did not intend the absurdity and adopt the other interpretation.

It is a cardinal principle in all statutes that you may not attach to a statutory provision a meaning that the words of that provision cannot reasonably bear. If they are capable of more than one meaning, then you can choose between those meanings, but beyond that you must not go.

A statute must be so construed as to make sense; to make every clause and phrase effective in deriving the legislative intent; and when the true purpose of the statute has been determined, it must be liberally and broadly construed in order to effectuate the purpose.

In construing a statute, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.

Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.

Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the Legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. UNITED STATES V. FISHER, 6 U. S. 358, 399 (1805); DOGGETT V. RAILROAD COMPANY, 99 U. S. 72 (1878)

One of the basic canons of statutory interpretation is that statutes should be interpreted to give meaning to each word. In construing the language of a rule, it is generally understood that the words should be given their common and approved usage.

In construing the language of a statute, we must take the words as written and give them their plain meaning.

The legislative intent is the ultimate control in construing a statute.

The legislative intent can only be arrived at by giving to the language used in the act its ordinary and natural import.

What the legislative intention was, can be derived only from the words they have used, and we cannot speculate beyond the reasonable import of these words. The spirit of the act must be extracted from the words of the act, and not from conjectures aliunde.

Where language is plain and unambiguous, court is bound to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.

It is a general rule of statutory construction that if the statute is clear and unambiguous, a court may not look beyond it but must give effect to its plain meaning.

Words or phrases in a statute cannot be isolated and be given a meaning foreign to their context.

In construing a statute, the court should consider the reason of the law.

In interpreting statute, the court must look first to the plain language of the statute and construe its provisions in terms of its object and policy, as well as the provisions of any related statutes, in order to ascertain the intent of Congress; in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ordinary meaning of the words used expresses the legislative intent; and if the statute is unclear, the court looks next to the legislative history).

Statute which is clear and unambiguous on its face cannot and should not be interpreted by a court.

Statute which is clear on its face is not open to construction, but if statute is ambiguous court must ascertain intent of legislators.

The question of statutory construction is one of soundly seeking and tolerantly effectuating convincing legislative intention.

A statute unambiguous on its face will not be subjected to further interpretation or construction, but where ambiguity exists, it is our duty to give effect to the intention of the Legislature in enacting the statute.

Where a law is constitutional, the courts cannot change the plain and unambiguous meaning of the language by writing therein a rule at variance with the law itself.

In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. The statute must be construed so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction.

Our duty is simply to construe the language of the statute as we find it. Where that language is plain and unambiguous we are not to speculate as to what was or might have been the intention of parliament, or as to the consequences which we think impolitic or undesirable which follow from adherence to the plain language of the statute.

Clear language precludes affording statute any meaning other than as expressed.

An unambiguous statute should not be interpreted, but should be enforced according to its clear language. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity. 73 Am. Jur.2d Statutes § 194 (1974). We need not consider rules of construction if the statute is clear upon its face.

The object of statutory construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. Where there is no ambiguity (in the words), there is no room for construction. Where the intention is clear, there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself.

There is nothing ambiguous in the term "natural-born". There is no uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, or vagueness in the words used. There is no room for argument and no room for construction. The language is plain and the meaning is clear. The term "natural" simply means that which is necessary to or inherent in the constitution of things. Laws that are self-enforcing are natural, and the term natural includes all the fundamental principles of mind and matter. Before the positive law existed, and of higher authority than it, natural law existed. Natural law is in the nature of material things and material forces; the moral law is in the nature of man and his relations to others. These laws are self-enforcing. All intellectually sane men recognize the fact that natural law is universal. All morally sane men recognize the fact that moral law is universal.

Natural-born citizenship is derived through birth to citizen parents. It is founded on Natural Law, as opposed to Positive Law. There is nothing doubtful in the words themselves, nothing ambiguous, nothing to be explained, and, therefore, no room for construction. Because there is no ambiguity, there is not need to look beyond the plain language of the statute to discern the statute's meaning.

Natural Born Citizens (Const. Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 5) are not made by law or otherwise, but born (of citizen parents).

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