Statutory Construction
Const. Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 5: "Statute Speaks For Itself"
The basic interpretive task is to determine the intent of the Constitution, laws, and treaties, and to construe all instruments according to the sense of the terms and the intentions of the parties. In the interpretation of the Constitution, the first rule is to examine both the general structure and the component parts of the document, keeping in mind its overall objectives and scope of power. The function of the judge is to interpret the law, not to ignore its provisions and make the law. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution establishes a hierarchy of laws, with the Constitution itself standing at the apex of the system. The Constitution embodies the constituent or "permanent will" of the American people, which gives it a republican basis.
A basic interpretive task is the task of determining intent. What was the intent of the lawmakers who made the law? Of the foreign ministers who drafted the treaty? Of the delegates who wrote the Constitution? In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone noted that the first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is to construe them according to the sense of the terms and the intention of the parties. He went on to explain that words are generally to be understood according to their usual or popular usage. If they are ambiguous, then the next step is to try to establish their meaning from the context, or by comparing them with other words and sentences in the same instrument, or by comparing them with another law on the same subject. Failing here, the judge may find the intent of the law by observing the subject matter or the purpose of the law.
As for the effects and consequences, the rule, said Blackstone, is that where words seem to lead the court to absurd results, it is helpful to abandon their literal meaning and rely on common sense. Finally, wrote Blackstone, judges should consider the reason and spirit of the law when the words are dubious and the alternative means of construction have failed to uncover the intent of the lawmakers.
The intention of the lawmakers is the law. This intention is to be gathered from the necessity or reason of the enactment and the meaning of the words, enlarged or restricted according to their real intent. Where the intention of the legislature is plain, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Where there is no uncertainty, or ambiguity in the language of the law, the intention of the lawmakers is to be arrived at by the language used.
Where the meaning is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and nothing for construction to do.
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction and the court is powerless to give it a different meaning.
In construction of statutes, intent of legislature must govern. Construction of statutory language is controlled by intent of legislature which must be determined from examination of language and purpose of statute.
The court does not make the law, but decides it. Legislative intent can only be arrived at by giving to the language its ordinary import.
The words of a statute cannot be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing cases merely because no good reason appears why those cases should be excluded. It is not the duty of the court to make the law reasonable, but to expound it as it stands, according to the real sense of the words.
If the language be plain, unambiguous, and uncontrolled by other parts of the act, or other acts or laws upon the same subject, the courts cannot give it a different meaning to subserve a public policy, or to maintain its constitutional validity.
The object of construction, applied to a constitution, is to give effect to the intent of its framers, and of the people in adopting it. This intent is to be found in the instrument itself; and, when the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument. LAKE COUNTY v. ROLLINS, 130 U.S. 662 (1889)
Statutory and constitutional construction rules require giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the language used. GARCIA V. UNITED STATES, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984). If the plain language is unambiguous, judicial inquiry ends, except in 'rare and exceptional circumstances.' Indeed, the Supreme Court has constantly reiterated that the language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evident meaning. SOLORIO v. UNITED STATES, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (quoting REID V. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1, 8 (1957)). It is the role of the Court to interpret the Constitution, not to add to it or subtract from it based on personal inclination.
A court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and legislative intent is best determined by the language of the statute. A court reading a statute should give the statutory language its plain and popularly understood meaning. When a statute is unambiguous, courts must enforce it as enacted. A court must not rewrite a statute to make it consistent with the court's idea of orderliness and public policy.
Where language of statute is unambiguous, court is powerless to intervene even to remedy mistake. Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, court is powerless to intervene and grant relief. Where the text is plain and unambiguous, courts are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself.
There is no room for judicial interpretation or construction of a statute containing plain and unambiguous language. When the plain language of a statute is clear, the court assumes the Legislature meant exactly what it said. Absent ambiguity, a statute's meaning is derived from its language alone.
An ambiguity exists if the language at issue is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. There is ambiguity if literal interpretation would lead to unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences. In case of incompleteness or ambiguity of expression the reason and spirit of the statute should be considered. Circumstances at time of enactment may be considered.
Unclear language in a statute can become clear if the congressional intent behind the legislation is reviewed.
With the text of a statute indeterminate, and in the absence of case law, an appellate court turns to the primary source of the statute, its legislative history, for guidance.
In searching for the clear expression of congressional intent in a statute, an appellate court is not limited to the text of the statute, but can consider all available evidence about the meaning of the statute, including its text, structure, and legislative history.
While statutes covering the same subject matter should be construed to harmonize them if possible, this does not empower courts to undercut the clearly expressed intent of Congress in enacting a particular statute. In cases of direct conflict, a specific statute overrides a general one, regardless of their dates of enactment.
A change in a rule cannot supplant a statute, including a statutorily based judicial decision. A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that, absent a clear direction of Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its enactment. It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction to construe a statute in accordance with its plain meaning.
Statutory construction begins with a look at the plain language of a rule; the plain language will control, unless use of the plain language would lead to an absurd result.
The ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity but no further.
It is only where the words are absolutely incapable of a construction that will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result that the words of the enactment must prevail.
When the language of a statute is plain it is not open to the court to remedy a defect of drafting.
If the words of an act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. If the words of an act admit two interpretations, and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the court will conclude the legislature did not intend the absurdity and adopt the other interpretation.
It is a cardinal principle in all statutes that you may not attach to a statutory provision a meaning that the words of that provision cannot reasonably bear. If they are capable of more than one meaning, then you can choose between those meanings, but beyond that you must not go.
A statute must be so construed as to make sense; to make every clause and phrase effective in deriving the legislative intent; and when the true purpose of the statute has been determined, it must be liberally and broadly construed in order to effectuate the purpose.
In construing a statute, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.
Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.
Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the Legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. UNITED STATES V. FISHER, 6 U. S. 358, 399 (1805); DOGGETT V. RAILROAD COMPANY, 99 U. S. 72 (1878)
One of the basic canons of statutory interpretation is that statutes should be interpreted to give meaning to each word. In construing the language of a rule, it is generally understood that the words should be given their common and approved usage.
In construing the language of a statute, we must take the words as written and give them their plain meaning.
The legislative intent is the ultimate control in construing a statute.
The legislative intent can only be arrived at by giving to the language used in the act its ordinary and natural import.
What the legislative intention was, can be derived only from the words they have used, and we cannot speculate beyond the reasonable import of these words. The spirit of the act must be extracted from the words of the act, and not from conjectures aliunde.
Where language is plain and unambiguous, court is bound to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.
It is a general rule of statutory construction that if the statute is clear and unambiguous, a court may not look beyond it but must give effect to its plain meaning.
Words or phrases in a statute cannot be isolated and be given a meaning foreign to their context.
In construing a statute, the court should consider the reason of the law.
In interpreting statute, the court must look first to the plain language of the statute and construe its provisions in terms of its object and policy, as well as the provisions of any related statutes, in order to ascertain the intent of Congress; in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ordinary meaning of the words used expresses the legislative intent; and if the statute is unclear, the court looks next to the legislative history).
Statute which is clear and unambiguous on its face cannot and should not be interpreted by a court.
Statute which is clear on its face is not open to construction, but if statute is ambiguous court must ascertain intent of legislators.
The question of statutory construction is one of soundly seeking and tolerantly effectuating convincing legislative intention.
A statute unambiguous on its face will not be subjected to further interpretation or construction, but where ambiguity exists, it is our duty to give effect to the intention of the Legislature in enacting the statute.
Where a law is constitutional, the courts cannot change the plain and unambiguous meaning of the language by writing therein a rule at variance with the law itself.
In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. The statute must be construed so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction.
Our duty is simply to construe the language of the statute as we find it. Where that language is plain and unambiguous we are not to speculate as to what was or might have been the intention of parliament, or as to the consequences which we think impolitic or undesirable which follow from adherence to the plain language of the statute.
Clear language precludes affording statute any meaning other than as expressed.
An unambiguous statute should not be interpreted, but should be enforced according to its clear language. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity. 73 Am. Jur.2d Statutes § 194 (1974). We need not consider rules of construction if the statute is clear upon its face.
The object of statutory construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. Where there is no ambiguity (in the words), there is no room for construction. Where the intention is clear, there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself.
There is nothing ambiguous in the term "natural-born". There is no uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, or vagueness in the words used. There is no room for argument and no room for construction. The language is plain and the meaning is clear. The term "natural" simply means that which is necessary to or inherent in the constitution of things. Laws that are self-enforcing are natural, and the term natural includes all the fundamental principles of mind and matter. Before the positive law existed, and of higher authority than it, natural law existed. Natural law is in the nature of material things and material forces; the moral law is in the nature of man and his relations to others. These laws are self-enforcing. All intellectually sane men recognize the fact that natural law is universal. All morally sane men recognize the fact that moral law is universal.
Natural-born citizenship is derived through birth to citizen parents. It is founded on Natural Law, as opposed to Positive Law. There is nothing doubtful in the words themselves, nothing ambiguous, nothing to be explained, and, therefore, no room for construction. Because there is no ambiguity, there is not need to look beyond the plain language of the statute to discern the statute's meaning.
Natural Born Citizens (Const. Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 5) are not made by law or otherwise, but born (of citizen parents).
Posted in Restore the Constitutional Republic
http://restoretheconstitutionalrepublic.com/forum/
A basic interpretive task is the task of determining intent. What was the intent of the lawmakers who made the law? Of the foreign ministers who drafted the treaty? Of the delegates who wrote the Constitution? In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone noted that the first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is to construe them according to the sense of the terms and the intention of the parties. He went on to explain that words are generally to be understood according to their usual or popular usage. If they are ambiguous, then the next step is to try to establish their meaning from the context, or by comparing them with other words and sentences in the same instrument, or by comparing them with another law on the same subject. Failing here, the judge may find the intent of the law by observing the subject matter or the purpose of the law.
As for the effects and consequences, the rule, said Blackstone, is that where words seem to lead the court to absurd results, it is helpful to abandon their literal meaning and rely on common sense. Finally, wrote Blackstone, judges should consider the reason and spirit of the law when the words are dubious and the alternative means of construction have failed to uncover the intent of the lawmakers.
The intention of the lawmakers is the law. This intention is to be gathered from the necessity or reason of the enactment and the meaning of the words, enlarged or restricted according to their real intent. Where the intention of the legislature is plain, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Where there is no uncertainty, or ambiguity in the language of the law, the intention of the lawmakers is to be arrived at by the language used.
Where the meaning is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and nothing for construction to do.
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction and the court is powerless to give it a different meaning.
In construction of statutes, intent of legislature must govern. Construction of statutory language is controlled by intent of legislature which must be determined from examination of language and purpose of statute.
The court does not make the law, but decides it. Legislative intent can only be arrived at by giving to the language its ordinary import.
The words of a statute cannot be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing cases merely because no good reason appears why those cases should be excluded. It is not the duty of the court to make the law reasonable, but to expound it as it stands, according to the real sense of the words.
If the language be plain, unambiguous, and uncontrolled by other parts of the act, or other acts or laws upon the same subject, the courts cannot give it a different meaning to subserve a public policy, or to maintain its constitutional validity.
The object of construction, applied to a constitution, is to give effect to the intent of its framers, and of the people in adopting it. This intent is to be found in the instrument itself; and, when the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument. LAKE COUNTY v. ROLLINS, 130 U.S. 662 (1889)
Statutory and constitutional construction rules require giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the language used. GARCIA V. UNITED STATES, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984). If the plain language is unambiguous, judicial inquiry ends, except in 'rare and exceptional circumstances.' Indeed, the Supreme Court has constantly reiterated that the language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evident meaning. SOLORIO v. UNITED STATES, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (quoting REID V. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1, 8 (1957)). It is the role of the Court to interpret the Constitution, not to add to it or subtract from it based on personal inclination.
A court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and legislative intent is best determined by the language of the statute. A court reading a statute should give the statutory language its plain and popularly understood meaning. When a statute is unambiguous, courts must enforce it as enacted. A court must not rewrite a statute to make it consistent with the court's idea of orderliness and public policy.
Where language of statute is unambiguous, court is powerless to intervene even to remedy mistake. Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, court is powerless to intervene and grant relief. Where the text is plain and unambiguous, courts are not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself.
There is no room for judicial interpretation or construction of a statute containing plain and unambiguous language. When the plain language of a statute is clear, the court assumes the Legislature meant exactly what it said. Absent ambiguity, a statute's meaning is derived from its language alone.
An ambiguity exists if the language at issue is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. There is ambiguity if literal interpretation would lead to unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences. In case of incompleteness or ambiguity of expression the reason and spirit of the statute should be considered. Circumstances at time of enactment may be considered.
Unclear language in a statute can become clear if the congressional intent behind the legislation is reviewed.
With the text of a statute indeterminate, and in the absence of case law, an appellate court turns to the primary source of the statute, its legislative history, for guidance.
In searching for the clear expression of congressional intent in a statute, an appellate court is not limited to the text of the statute, but can consider all available evidence about the meaning of the statute, including its text, structure, and legislative history.
While statutes covering the same subject matter should be construed to harmonize them if possible, this does not empower courts to undercut the clearly expressed intent of Congress in enacting a particular statute. In cases of direct conflict, a specific statute overrides a general one, regardless of their dates of enactment.
A change in a rule cannot supplant a statute, including a statutorily based judicial decision. A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that, absent a clear direction of Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its enactment. It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction to construe a statute in accordance with its plain meaning.
Statutory construction begins with a look at the plain language of a rule; the plain language will control, unless use of the plain language would lead to an absurd result.
The ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity but no further.
It is only where the words are absolutely incapable of a construction that will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result that the words of the enactment must prevail.
When the language of a statute is plain it is not open to the court to remedy a defect of drafting.
If the words of an act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. If the words of an act admit two interpretations, and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the court will conclude the legislature did not intend the absurdity and adopt the other interpretation.
It is a cardinal principle in all statutes that you may not attach to a statutory provision a meaning that the words of that provision cannot reasonably bear. If they are capable of more than one meaning, then you can choose between those meanings, but beyond that you must not go.
A statute must be so construed as to make sense; to make every clause and phrase effective in deriving the legislative intent; and when the true purpose of the statute has been determined, it must be liberally and broadly construed in order to effectuate the purpose.
In construing a statute, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.
Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.
Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the Legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. UNITED STATES V. FISHER, 6 U. S. 358, 399 (1805); DOGGETT V. RAILROAD COMPANY, 99 U. S. 72 (1878)
One of the basic canons of statutory interpretation is that statutes should be interpreted to give meaning to each word. In construing the language of a rule, it is generally understood that the words should be given their common and approved usage.
In construing the language of a statute, we must take the words as written and give them their plain meaning.
The legislative intent is the ultimate control in construing a statute.
The legislative intent can only be arrived at by giving to the language used in the act its ordinary and natural import.
What the legislative intention was, can be derived only from the words they have used, and we cannot speculate beyond the reasonable import of these words. The spirit of the act must be extracted from the words of the act, and not from conjectures aliunde.
Where language is plain and unambiguous, court is bound to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.
It is a general rule of statutory construction that if the statute is clear and unambiguous, a court may not look beyond it but must give effect to its plain meaning.
Words or phrases in a statute cannot be isolated and be given a meaning foreign to their context.
In construing a statute, the court should consider the reason of the law.
In interpreting statute, the court must look first to the plain language of the statute and construe its provisions in terms of its object and policy, as well as the provisions of any related statutes, in order to ascertain the intent of Congress; in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ordinary meaning of the words used expresses the legislative intent; and if the statute is unclear, the court looks next to the legislative history).
Statute which is clear and unambiguous on its face cannot and should not be interpreted by a court.
Statute which is clear on its face is not open to construction, but if statute is ambiguous court must ascertain intent of legislators.
The question of statutory construction is one of soundly seeking and tolerantly effectuating convincing legislative intention.
A statute unambiguous on its face will not be subjected to further interpretation or construction, but where ambiguity exists, it is our duty to give effect to the intention of the Legislature in enacting the statute.
Where a law is constitutional, the courts cannot change the plain and unambiguous meaning of the language by writing therein a rule at variance with the law itself.
In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. The statute must be construed so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction.
Our duty is simply to construe the language of the statute as we find it. Where that language is plain and unambiguous we are not to speculate as to what was or might have been the intention of parliament, or as to the consequences which we think impolitic or undesirable which follow from adherence to the plain language of the statute.
Clear language precludes affording statute any meaning other than as expressed.
An unambiguous statute should not be interpreted, but should be enforced according to its clear language. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity. 73 Am. Jur.2d Statutes § 194 (1974). We need not consider rules of construction if the statute is clear upon its face.
The object of statutory construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. Where there is no ambiguity (in the words), there is no room for construction. Where the intention is clear, there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself.
There is nothing ambiguous in the term "natural-born". There is no uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, or vagueness in the words used. There is no room for argument and no room for construction. The language is plain and the meaning is clear. The term "natural" simply means that which is necessary to or inherent in the constitution of things. Laws that are self-enforcing are natural, and the term natural includes all the fundamental principles of mind and matter. Before the positive law existed, and of higher authority than it, natural law existed. Natural law is in the nature of material things and material forces; the moral law is in the nature of man and his relations to others. These laws are self-enforcing. All intellectually sane men recognize the fact that natural law is universal. All morally sane men recognize the fact that moral law is universal.
Natural-born citizenship is derived through birth to citizen parents. It is founded on Natural Law, as opposed to Positive Law. There is nothing doubtful in the words themselves, nothing ambiguous, nothing to be explained, and, therefore, no room for construction. Because there is no ambiguity, there is not need to look beyond the plain language of the statute to discern the statute's meaning.
Natural Born Citizens (Const. Art. 2, Sec. 1, Clause 5) are not made by law or otherwise, but born (of citizen parents).
Posted in Restore the Constitutional Republic
http://restoretheconstitutionalrepublic.com/forum/
